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The Irvine 11 Case:




In 2011, a few months after Operation Cast Lead, the Israeli
government's bombing campaign of the Gaza strip in Palestine,
Osama Shabaik visited Gaza to deliver medical aid.' What he
witnessed while he was there was complete and utter devastation.2
"Many families still lived in the rubble of their destroyed homes"
while "[t]hose still lucky enough to have homes lived with clear
remnants of the war" in homes "riddled" with bullet holes.' While
in Gaza, Shabaik met the Sammouni cousins, who were orphaned
in the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead when a bomb fell on their
home and killed their family. 4 The devastation and loss of human
life that he witnessed compelled Shabaik to "speak out" and
protest against the Israeli government's policy that led to the
destruction in Gaza.
On February 8, 2010, Michael Oren, Israeli Ambassador to
the United States, delivered a speech to a packed audience at the
University of California, Irvine.' With images of the devastation
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1. Osama Shabaik, Op-Ed., Unprecedented Silencing of Dissent at UC Irvine,
JERUSALEM POST (Oct. 16, 2011), http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/
Article.aspx?ID=241870&R=R1; see also AMNESTY INT'L, ISRAEL/GAZA OPERATION
'CAST LEAD': 22 DAYS OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION 1, available at http://www.
amnesty.org/en/librarylasset/MDE15/015/2009/en/8f299083-9a74-4853-860f-
0563725e633almde150152009en.pdf ("Some 1,400 Palestinians" were killed, 300 of
which were children, along with "hundreds of other unarmed civilians, and large
areas of Gaza had been razed to the ground, leaving many thousands homeless and
the already dire economy in ruins").




6. People's Opposition to Motion to Recuse the Office of the District Attorney
at 4, California v. Herzallah, No. 11CM01351 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 14, 2011)
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in Gaza and the Sammouni cousins still fresh in his mind, Shabaik
decided to make a "poignant statement" during the Ambassador's
speech.7 The disparities in communicative power between an
individual and a nation state compelled him and his peers to
express their grievances outside of the traditional question and
answer framework of a university lecture8 by loudly voicing their
political dissent.' Shabaik and his peers got up one by one while
the Ambassador was speaking and shouted statements that were
critical both of Israel's policy leading to the destruction of Gaza
during Operation Cast Lead and the Ambassador's role in shaping
it. 10
Shabaik was the first to interrupt the speech, and shouted
"Michael Oren, propagating murder is not free speech.""
Following his interruption, his peers joined in, shouting, "Michael
Oren you are a war criminal," and "[ilt's a shame this University
has sponsored a mass murderer like yourself!"l' After shouting
each statement, the students complied with orders to leave the
auditorium, were subsequently arrested, and were subjected to
university disciplinary proceedings." Further, in what many
called an unprecedented move, the Orange County District
Attorney's Office pressed criminal charges against the students for
their nonviolent political protest.14
The decision to criminally charge the eleven students, who
have become known as the "Irvine 11," has generated major
controversy." On one end, the supporters of the prosecution argue
that "[flailing to punish offenders appropriately"16 will set a bad
[hereinafter People's Opposition to Motion].
7. See Shabaik, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Raymond Barrett, Legal Battle Over Campus Protest, Raises Questions
of Free Speech, Islamophobia, WASH. DIPLOMAT (July 27, 2011), http://www.wash
diplomat.com/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=7957%3Alegal-
battle-over-campus-protest-raises-questions-of-free-speech-islamophobia&catid=
1476&Itemid=428; Profile: Michael Oren, GEO. PROGRAM FOR JEWISH CIVILIZATION,
http://pjc.georgetown.edu/77196.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2012) (noting Oren's
service as a media relations officer for the Israeli Defense Forces during Operation
Cast Lead).
11. People's Opposition to Motion, supra note 6, at 7.
12. Id.
13. See Nick Meyer, Irvine 11 Conviction Sets a Dangerous Precedent, Attorney
Says, ARAB AM. NEWS (Oct. 8, 2011), http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/
index.php?mod=article&cat=Community&article=4816.
14. See id.
15. See Barrett, supra note 10.
16. Adam Kissel, Disruptive Protesters Face Disciplinary Consequences at UC
Irvine, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC. (Feb. 10, 2010), http://thefire.org/
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precedent, 7 and will ultimately have the effect of inhibiting debate
by encouraging groups to interrupt speakers with whom they
disagree." On the other end, critics have cried that prosecution
will chill student activism and discourage students from engaging
in controversial or political speech on campus." University of
California faculty members spoke out against the prosecution in a
signed letter "urging the [Dlistrict [A]ttorney to drop the charge
and that university sanctions were punishment enough."2 0
Prominent civil rights groups have cited Islamophobia and
pressure from outside sources as reasons for the prosecution, and
have questioned the District Attorney's motive for using a
disproportionate amount of resources to pursue students, who
were involved in a minor campus protest, with excessive zeal.21
This Article will analyze the prosecution of the Irvine 11 from
a policy perspective.2 Part I will discuss the theories underlying
freedom of speech, and the importance of freedom of speech in the
university context. Part II will provide a background on prosecu-
torial discretion and its potential abuses. Part III will discuss the
California Penal Code, the prosecution of the Irvine 11, and other
instances of distinguished speakers being heckled in Orange
County. Part IV will examine the value of heckling as a form of
protest. Part V will discuss how the Irvine 11 prosecution
represents the danger of discriminatory enforcement, specifically
discussing the role that biases and stereotypes can play in
influencing prosecutorial discretion, and why the Irvine 11
prosecution is a bad policy decision. Finally, Part VI will provide
solutions to the complex problems that the Irvine 11 prosecution
presents for both prosecutors and universities.
article/11560.html (concluding that failure to punish such offenders "is likely to
threaten the free speech of future speakers by effectively condoning a 'heckler's
veto' through disruptive actions. That would make a mockery of the First
Amendment").
17. See Scott Jaschik, Is Heckling a Right?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 27, 2010),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/02/17/heckle#ixzzlfWjAbL4J.
18. Id.
19. See Hamed Aleaziz, Should Heckling Be Illegal?, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 26,
2011), http://motherjones.com/mojo/2011/09/should-heckling-be-illegal.
20. Josh Keller, California Jury Convicts 10 Muslim Students of Interrupting
Campus Speech, CHRON. OF HIGHER ED. (Sept. 25, 2011), http://chronicle.com/
article/California-Jury-Convicts-10/129159/.
21. See Barrett, supra note 10.
22. This Article will acknowledge constitutional arguments raised by the case,




I. The Importance of Free Speech in a University Setting
Freedom of speech is of the utmost importance in the
university setting.13 At college, students are encouraged to think
critically both inside and outside the classroom by freely debating
and discussing ideas.2 4  "The public university has been
acknowledged as an arena in which accepted, discounted-even
repugnant-beliefs, opinions and ideas challenge each other."25
The university is the quintessential marketplace of ideas.26
Maximum exposure to a vigorous interchange of ideas "which
discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues,' lies at the heart of a
university education."27  Among "the important and substantial
purposes of the university" is to "facilitate a wide range of
speech."28 Exposing students to diverse ideas is at the core of a
university's mission.29 Further, university students are often
encouraged to explore and challenge ideas in student-run organi-
zations assembled around a common cause or idea that interests
them."o These organizations range from general interest, ethnic,
or religious groups, to groups assembled around a political cause.
The importance of freedom of speech is illustrated by the
theories underlying the First Amendment: (1) the marketplace of
ideas; (2) the balance between stability and change; (3) self-
governance; and (4) individual autonomy.
A. The Marketplace of Ideas
First, according to the marketplace of ideas theory, freedom
of expression promotes society's discovery of truth and advance-
ment of knowledge by allowing individuals to reach the most
23. See John L. Esposito, The Irvine 11: Student Freedom of Speech and Dissent
Under Siege, HUFFINGTON POST (June 16, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
john-l-esposito/student-freedom-of-speech-irvine-11_b_877025.html.
24. See id.
25. Laura L. Goodman, Shacking Up with the First Amendment: Symbolic
Expression and the Public University, 64 IND. L.J. 711, 716 n.39 (1989) (quoting
Good v. Associated Students of the Univ. of Wash., 542 P.2d 762, 769 (Wash.
1975)).
26. See infra notes 31-42 for a discussion of the marketplace of ideas.
27. Goodman, supra note 25, at 716 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967)); see also Mark J. Fiore, Trampling the "Marketplace of Ideas":
The Case Against Extending Hazelwood to College Campuses, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1915, 1948 (2002).
28. Fiore, supra note 27, at 1950 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217, 231 (2000)).
29. See id.
30. See Esposito, supra note 23.
[Vol. 30:371374
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rational decision through uninhibited discourse." The theory
specifically contends that individuals can only reach "the most
rational and informed decision" 3 2 by "considering all facts and
arguments" that support or defend a certain position." The theory
presupposes that the suppression of ideas "blocks the generation of
new ideas, and tends to perpetuate error."3 4 In the marketplace of
ideas, "[t]he only justification for suppressing an opinion is that
those who seek to suppress it are infallible in their judgment of the
truth."" This justification is a legal fiction because "no individual
or group can be infallible, particularly in a constantly changing
world." 6
Opponents of the theory contend that the marketplace of
ideas is inherently unequal, because it only protects speech once it
has already entered into the marketplace, without ensuring equal
access to all types of speech to the marketplace itself.17  They
therefore argue that because only certain groups and individuals
have access to the marketplace, some speech never makes it to the
marketplace." For example, unpopular ideas or ideas espoused by
minority groups may never be heard in the marketplace of ideas
because of the "disparities in communicative power" between
minority and majority groups.39 "The marketplace of ideas, these
critics argue, is likely to reflect and justify the positions of
powerful speakers, rather than the merit or 'truth' of the ideas
they express."" Despite these criticisms, the marketplace of ideas
doctrine remains the dominant justification for free speech in the
United States." Further, because the theory holds that no speech
31. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,
72 YALE L.J. 877, 881 (1963). The theory of the marketplace of ideas was first
introduced in constitutional jurisprudence in the United States by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, in his dissent in Abrams v. United States. Fiore, supra note 27, at
1915 n.1 (citing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
32. Eve H. Lewin Wagner, Heckling: A Protected Right or Disorderly Conduct?,
60 S. CAL. L. REv. 215, 227 (1986).
33. Emerson, supra note 31.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 882.
36. Id.
37. Nancy Whitmore, First Amendment Showdown: Intellectual Diversity
Mandates and the Academic Marketplace, 13 COMM. L. & POL'Y 321, 327 (2008).
38. See Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J.
821, 832-33 (2008); Whitmore, supra note 37.
39. See Blocher, supra note 38, at 832.
40. Id. at 832-33.
41. See id. at 828.
3752012]
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can be infallible, it serves to guard all types of speech and prevents
us from silencing those with whom we disagree.4 2
B. Balance Between Stability and Change
Second, freedom of speech can also serve as a means of social
control." According to Thomas Emerson, "the principle of open
discussion is a method of achieving a more adaptable and at the
same time more stable community, of maintaining the precarious
balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus.""
Expressing dissent allows disaffected persons to release their
frustration and energy." Moreover, silencing certain types of
speech can cause resentment in groups or can make the speech
itself more appealing." Therefore, freedom of speech can serve as
a means of avoiding "social unrest or apathy" by allowing people to
release their frustrations through their opinionated speech.4 7
C. Self-Governance
Third, the self-governance theory of free speech holds that
"freedom of speech is a necessary prerequisite to democracy and
self-governance."" In order for democracy to function properly, the
governed must be able to make informed choices, which they can
only do if they have free access to information." Further, free
expression is essential for people to participate in the decision-
making process because it allows open and free discussions to take
place." Hence, freedom of speech helps the "democratic
42. See MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT
THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 8 (2001).
43. Emerson, supra note 31, at 884.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 885.
46. Craig Anderson, Political Correctness on College Campuses: Freedom of
Speech v. Doing the Politically Correct Thing, 46 SMU L. REV. 171, 178-79 (1992).
47. Wagner, supra note 32, at 228.
48. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 7 (1970)
("Once one accepts the premise of the Declaration of Independence-that
governments 'derive their just powers from the consent of the governed'-it follows
that the governed must, in order to exercise their right of consent, have full
freedom of expression both in forming individual judgments . . . ."); Anderson,
supra note 46, at 178.
49. Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational
Paradigm of Free Expression, 20 UCLA L. REV. 103, 116-17 (1992) ("[F]ree
expression is indispensable for the promotion of the free flow of ideas that is
necessary for a democratic polity to govern itself.").
50. See Massey, supra note 49, at 118 ("The reason for public debate is to
enable every person within the polity to express his or her view in hope that it will
convince others."); Wagner, supra note 32, at 228.
376 [Vol. 30:371
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experiment" succeed by allowing individuals easy access to
information and opinions, permitting them to make informed
d -* 51decisions."
D. Individual Autonomy
Last, according to the individual autonomy theory, freedom of
speech is a fundamental right of the individual that enables one to
evolve as a person and achieve "self-realization."5 2 Freedom of
speech allows people to develop "individual judgment and person-
ality through the free discussion of ideas."" To achieve self-
realization a person's mind must be free, thus "suppression of
belief, opinion, or other expression is an affront to the dignity of [a
person]."" Therefore, the theory of freedom of expression
"contemplates a mode of life that, through encouraging toleration,
skepticism, reason and initiative," allows one to realize their full
potential."
The theories underlying freedom of speech emphasize the
fundamental importance of free speech in American society. Given
its importance, a policy that serves to chill freedom of speech, such
as the criminalization of nonviolent speech, should be practiced
with great caution.
II. The Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion: Background
and Dangers
"[Prosecutorial discretion is] the most dangerous power of the
prosecutor [because it enables the prosecutor] to pick people he
thinks he should get rather than pick cases that need to be
prosecuted."
-Justice Robert Jackson5 6
A. Prosecutorial Discretion: The Broad Discretion
to Charge
Before advocating a policy that proscribes nonprosecution, it
is important to consider the discretion prosecutors have in
51. BUNKER, supra note 42.
52. Wagner, supra note 32 ("In order for an individual to achieve self-
realization, he or she must be able to express his or her views and discuss them
openly with others.").
53. BUNKER, supra note 42, at 12-13.
54. EMERSON, supra note 48, at 6.
55. Emerson, supra note 31, at 886.
56. Greene, supra note 66, at 778.
3772012]
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deciding whether to initiate criminal proceedings. Prosecutors in
the United States exercise broad discretion in criminal prose-
cutions." Discretion provides prosecutors the flexibility to take
into account the facts and circumstances of each individual case
when making a decision to prosecute.5 8 Prosecutors are not legally
required to bring charges against individuals accused of crimes;
the decision to do so is entirely within their judgment."9 In some
cases, even if there is sufficient evidence to convict an individual, a
prosecutor can refuse to prosecute a case "for good cause consistent
with the public interest.""o Prosecutors can initiate a criminal
prosecution of an individual if they believe there is probable cause
that the accused committed a crime and if there is sufficient
admissible evidence to support a conviction of the accused.61 The
decision to charge someone, the nature of the charge, the use of a
grand jury, and the dismissal of charges are all discretionary
decisions that prosecutors make when deciding what course of
action to take in a criminal proceeding.62 The discretion to
prosecute therefore also includes the discretion to not prosecute .
Given the broad powers prosecutors hold, prosecutorial
discretion is also ripe for abuse. It can lead to inconsistent,
discriminatory, and arbitrary decisions, and unequal treatment for
similarly situated individuals." Further, discretion can be
particularly hazardous in cases where individuals are prosecuted
57. See Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1971) (noting that prosecutors exercise
considerable discretion); Conor Clark & Austin Sarat, Beyond Discretion:
Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty, and the Limits of Law, 33 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 387, 389 (2008) (noting that prosecutors have substantial discretion in
which enforcement strategy to use). The judiciary recognizes and defers to the
broad prosecutorial discretionary power, partly due to the separation of power
doctrine, which invests the enforcement of the law in the executive branch. See
ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR
14 (2007).
58. See DAVIS, supra note 57, at 13 (noting that if prosecutors lacked discretion
they would have to bring charges in cases that were "frivolous" or "where the
evidence is weak"); Abrams, supra note 57.
59. See DAVIS, supra note 57 (noting that no law requires someone to be
charged if they commit a crime).
60. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS § 3-3.9(b) (3d ed. 1993) (listing factors that a
prosecutor may consider in deciding whether to prosecute a case).
61. Id. § 3-3.9(a).
62. See 35 GEO. L.J. (ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC.) 203 (2006).
63. See People's Opposition to Motion, supra note 6, at 15. The decision not to
prosecute can involve a determination of whether there is an alternative to formal
criminal prosecution. Id.
64. See DAVIS, supra note 57, at 15; Abrams, supra note 57, at 3; Sarah J. Cox,
Prosecutorial Discretion: An Overview, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 388, 391 (1975).
[Vol. 30:371378
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under laws that are not normally enforced." Finally, discretion
can serve as a potential source of injustice against racial and
ethnic minorities, whose views are often underrepresented in
prosecutorial decision-making. 66 The potential abuse of
prosecutorial discretion is highlighted by social cognition theory, 67
Islamophobia," and the discriminatory enforcement of statutes
that penalize speech. 9
B. The Danger of Bias and Stereotypes Influencing
Prosecutorial Decision-Making
1. Social Cognition Theory
Most modern day discrimination results from unconscious
cognitive psychological processes, rather than motivational
psychological processes." "According to social cognition theory, we
all possess subconscious or implicit biases" that are based on
stereotypes about groups." "These biases shape how we perceive,
make decisions about, and interact with others."" "[E]ven though
we may consciously reject negative stereotypes about other
groups" and may not be aware that we hold such biases, these
biases have a strong effect on our subconscious. Unconscious
stereotypes and biases held by the general public can also
influence prosecutorial discretion.74 Because biases can potentially
affect the decision-making of prosecutors, it is particularly
important that they take affirmative steps to ensure that their
decisions are not influenced by biases.
65. Cox, supra note 64, at 388-89 (citing laws that were created for a moral
purpose and social control as examples of laws that are still on the books, but are
rarely enforced by law enforcement officials).
66. See Dwight L. Greene, Abusive Prosecutors: Gender, Race & Class
Discretion and the Prosecution of Drug-Addicted Mothers, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 737, 741
(1991).
67. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text for a discussion on social
cognition theory.
68. See infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text for a discussion on
Islamophobia.
69. See infra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
70. Eva Paterson et al., The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection in the 21st
Century: Building upon Charles Lawrence's Vision to Mount a Contemporary
Challenge to the Intent Doctrine, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1175, 1188 (2008).
71. Id. at 1186.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1187.
74. See Greene, supra note 66, at 780 ("[P]rosecutors as a group are not
presumptively less prejudiced than other [W]hite Americans in respect to race,
gender and class biases.").
75. See infra notes 198-204.
2012] 379
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2. Islamophobia7 1 in the United States
The treatment of Muslims after the September 11, 2001,
attacks is an example of race, ethnicity, and religion playing a role
in the unequal treatment of persons by law enforcement." After
the September 11 attacks, Muslims and people of Arab and South
Asian descent were subjected to "government policies such as
'voluntary' questioning, special registration, and airport sweeps"
as a result of their ethnicity and religious beliefs." Most of the
examples of racial profiling of the Muslim community are carried
out in the realm of terrorism prevention; however, this does not
mean that stereotypes and biases do not influence prosecutors in
other realms of law enforcement. 79 Recently, the Public Research
Institute found that "45 percent of Americans agree that Islam is
at odds with American values.""o Further, according to the Gallup
Center for Muslim Studies, "43 percent of Americans admit to
feeling some prejudice toward followers of Islam.""
In state legislatures, discrimination against Muslims is being
perpetuated in the form of anti-Sharia bills, which prohibit state
courts from applying or considering Islamic or Sharia law.
Oklahoma was the first state to introduce an anti-Sharia measure
on its ballot, which was approved by voters in 2010 by seventy
percent. 82 A preliminary injunction was granted by a federal
district court in Oklahoma and later upheld by Tenth Circuit
76. "Islamophobia is close-minded prejudice against or hatred of Islam and
Muslims. An Islamophobe is an individual who holds a closed-minded view of
Islam and promotes prejudice against or hatred of Muslims." COUNCIL ON AM.-
ISLAMIC RELATIONS, ISLAMOPHOBIA AND ITS IMPACT IN THE UNITED STATES:
JANUARY 2009-DECEMBER 2010, at 6 (2010), available at http://crg.berkeley.edu/
sites/defaultifiles/islamophobiareport2009-2010.pdf [hereinafter CAIR
ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT].
77. Yoav Sapir, Neither Intent nor Impact: A Critique of the Racially Based
Selective Prosecution Jurisprudence and a Reform Proposal, 19 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 127, 128 (2003).
78. Sunita Patel, Performative Aspects of Race: "Arab, Muslim, and South
Asian" Racial Formation After September 11, 10 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 61, 62 (2005).
79. See Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1413 (2002) ("[Rlacial profiling is more likely to mean
security checks or federal investigations that target Muslim men from Middle
Eastern countries, in order to try to catch terrorists.").
80. CAIR ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT, supra note 76.
81. Id. at 24. In August 2010, a Time magazine poll found that twenty-eight
percent of voters believe that a Muslim should not be eligible to sit on the Supreme
Court and nearly one-third of Americans believe that Muslims should not be
allowed to run for President. Id. at 6.
82. Stephen Ceasar, Appeals Court Affirms Order Blocking Oklahoma Sharia
Law Ban, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/10/nation/
la-na-oklahoma-sharia-20120111.
380 [Vol. 30:371
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Court of Appeals, which found that the law raises serious
constitutional issues including interference with a Muslim's ability
to freely practice his or her religion." Prejudice and bias against
Muslims is pervasive in the United States and in some instances is
even state sanctioned.
3. Discriminatory Enforcement of Speech Crimes
Statutes that criminalize speech are prone to discriminatory
enforcement by law enforcement. Traditionally, "lesser crimes"
such as breach of the peace statutes were written in vague terms,
thus granting broad discretionary powers to law enforcement
officers.' These statutes were written in broad terms because
human behavior is often "so diverse that not all forms [of human
behavior] can be anticipated."" Courts have traditionally viewed
these statutes with "skepticism" to ensure that law enforcement
officials do not violate individual rights because of the broad and
vague language of the statute. 6 But even when these statutes are
tailored by courts to make sure that they do not violate individual
rights, the statutes can still be used improperly by law enforce-
ment officials." For decades, "breach of the peace" statutes have
been discriminatorily enforced by law enforcement to criminalize
speakers who espouse unpopular views." For a breach of the
83. Awad v. Ziriax, No. 10-6273, 2012 WL 50636 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 2012);
CAIR ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT, supra note 76, at 48-49 (providing a detailed
discussion of the factual background and district court ruling of the case); Ceasar,
supra note 82.
84. See John B. Phillips, The Proposed Criminal Code: Disorderly Conduct and
Related Offenses, 40 TENN. L. REV. 725, 725 (1973).
85. Id.
86. Id.; see also Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Private Purpose: The Role of
Government Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 456-61
(1996) (discussing cases where the court has invalidated laws that, by conferring
"standardless discretion," "effectively delegate[] to administrators the power to
make decisions about speech on the basis of content").
87. See Kagan, supra note 86, at 462. Law enforcement officials are not allowed
to penalize views or content of speech; however, laws that criminalize speech such
as hostile audience laws are prone to abuse. Id.
88. See, e.g., Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 317, 321 (1951) (holding that
petitioner was properly arrested after making a speech that endorsed racial
equality, criticized public officials, and nearly resulted in rioting by the audience);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (affirming the conviction
of Chaplinsky for using "profane" or "libelous" speech attacking religion and
government); Kagan, supra note 86, at 462 ("[I1n case after case, decade after
decade, police officers have responded hastily, to say the least, to the risk of
disorder caused by disfavored speech."). But see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
26 (1971) (holding that a state could not make the public display of speech
attacking the draft a criminal offense).
Law and Inequality
peace to occur there must be some kind of a public disturbance."9
In the case of a speech, it is the content of the speech that usually
triggers the public disturbance.90 For instance, if a speaker is
giving a speech advocating an unpopular view that the majority
does not agree with, the audience may react by causing a public
disturbance, constituting a breach of the peace." Hence, a breach
of the peace statute effectively penalizes speakers who hold
1 * 92
unpopular views.
III. The Prosecution of Speech: Background on the Irvine
11 Case
A. California Penal Code Section 403 Interpreted
The Irvine 11 students were charged under California Penal
Code section 403 ("section 403"), willful disturbance of assembly. 93
The language of the penal code reads: "[e]very person who,
without authority, willfully disturbs or breaks up any public
assembly or public meeting, not unlawful in its character, is guilty
of a violation of Penal Code § 403, a misdemeanor." 94 The statute
penalizes disturbances that "substantially impair[] the conduct of
a public assembly."" Section 403 has been considered by
California courts in two recent cases," In re Kay" and McMahon v.
Albany Unified School District.9
In the case In re Kay, the California Supreme Court
overturned the conviction of farm workers who were convicted
under section 403 for willfully disturbing a lawful meeting by
"engagling] in rhythmical clapping and some shouting for about




93. CAL. PENAL CODE § 403 (West 1999).
94. Id. Each of the following elements must be proved: (1) the defendant
substantially impaired the conduct of a public assembly or public meeting by
committing acts in violation of implicit customs or usages applicable to the type of
meeting being held, or in violation of explicit rules for the conduct of that meeting;
(2) the defendant knew, or as a reasonable person should have known of these
customs, usages or rules; (3) the defendant's acts were intentionally committed;
and (4) the defendant's activity itself, and not the content of the activity's
expression, substantially impaired the effective conduct of the meeting. See In re
Kay, 464 P.2d 142, 150 (Cal. 1970).
95. In re Kay, 464 P.2d at 150.
96. For an example of an earlier consideration of the provision, see Farraher v.
Superior Court of Kern County, 187 P. 72 (Cal. 1919).
97. 464 P.2d at 142.
98. 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
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five or ten minutes" during an outdoor speech by then
Congressman John V. Tunney."9 Acknowledging the value of
heckling, the California Supreme Court stated:
Audience activities, such as heckling, interrupting, harsh
questioning, and booing, even though they may be impolite
and discourteous, can nonetheless advance the goals of the
First Amendment. For many citizens such participation in
public meetings, whether supportive or critical of the speaker,
may constitute the only manner in which they can express
their views to a large number of people .... . o
Noting that "[a] cogent remark, even though rudely timed or
phrased, may 'contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the
ascertainment of truth,"'o the court invoked the marketplace of
ideas theory to emphasize the importance of audience expression
and viewpoints during public assemblies. 1 02  Because the First
Amendment contemplates "debate of important public issues" it
"can hardly be narrowed to the meeting at which the audience
must passively listen to a single point of view."0 ' This holding
acknowledged that "heckling may serve a useful function in the
political process by forcing a speaker to discuss difficult issues and
might aid in the correction of evils which would otherwise escape
opposition."10 ' In re Kay, therefore, recognizes the importance and
value of heckling as a form of protest, and can be construed to
uphold the right to do so in certain instances. o0
By contrast, the California Court of Appeals in McMahon
upheld the conviction of a man accused of violating section 403 by
99. In re Kay, 464 P.2d at 145. Congressman Tunney even acknowledged the
protestors' right to free speech, paused until they finished protesting and "told
them to be grateful that they live in a country whose Constitution protects their
right to demonstrate in that manner." Id.; see also Kevin Francis O'Neill,
Disentangling the Law of Public Protest, 45 LOy. L. REV. 411, 448 n.187 (1999).
100. In re Kay, 464 P.2d at 147. The court also noted that "heckling and
harassment of public officials and other speakers while making public speeches is
as old as American and British politics." Id.
101. Id. (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 397 U.S. 64, 73 (1964)).
102. Id. ("The First Amendment does not merely insure a marketplace of ideas in
which there is but one seller.").
103. Id.; see also Wagner, supra note 32, at 222-23 (noting courts' recognition of
a right to heckle in several cases, including In re Kay).
104. See In re Kay, 464 P.2d at 148 ("The very possibility of adverse audience
reaction may aid in the correction of evil which would otherwise escape oppo-
sition. . . . The public interest in an active and critical audience has long been
recognized."); Wagner, supra note 32, at 223.
105. While the In re Kay court recognized the right to heckle, it also noted that
in certain circumstances where a heckler "substantially impairs the effective
conduct of the meeting" by violating the customs and usages of the respective
meeting, a conviction would be upheld. In re Kay, 464 P.2d at 150; see also Wagner,
supra note 32, at 223.
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dumping garbage on the floor during a school board meeting. 10
The court applied the same construction of the statute as In re
Kay, concluding that by dumping garbage on the floor, the
defendant violated the customs and usages of the school board
meeting and substantially impaired the effective conduct of the
meeting."o However, McMahon is not factually similar to In re
Kay or the Irvine 11 case, because it does not involve hecklers
interrupting a meeting by shouting.0 8  Rather, it involves the
disruption of a meeting through physically damaging conduct.10
Thus, based on the precedent, when pure speech is involved,
California courts recognize the importance of using heckling as a
form of protest during a public assembly.
B. The Irvine 11 Case: Facts and Verdict
On February 8, 2010, Michael Oren, the Israeli Ambassador
to the United States, spoke at an event at the University of
California - Irvine (UCI).n0 During Mr. Oren's speech, ten
students stood up one by one and shouted harsh statements
criticizing Israel's foreign policy."' Police officers subsequently
escorted each student out of the auditorium."2 The disruptions
culminated "in a loud walkout by the disrupting group and a
chanting demonstration outside the auditorium.""' Despite the
time that was lost during the disruptions, Mr. Oren ultimately
concluded his speech."4 As a result of the incident, the individual
students involved faced university disciplinary proceedings."' UCI
106. McMahon v. Albany Unified Sch. Dist., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 187 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002).
107. Id. at 188-89.
108. Id. at 185-87 (describing MacMahon's interruption of a meeting through
the dumping of garbage); In re Kay, 464 P.2d at 143-46 (detailing the In re Kay
defendants' interruption of a meeting through clapping and shouting).
109. McMahon, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185-87.
110. People's Opposition to Motion, supra note 6.
111. Id. at 7-9. According to one of the participants of the protest, the protest
lasted for seven minutes during a ninety minute speech. Shabaik, supra note 1.
The students accused Israel and Mr. Oren of violating international law and
committing human rights violations during Operation Cast Lead. See Amriah
Mizrahi et al., Irvine 11 Conviction Reveals Double Standard and Bias,
MONDOWEISS (Oct. 11, 2011), http://mondoweiss.net/2011/10/irvine-11-conviction-
reveals-double-standard-and-bias.html.
112. See People's Opposition to Motion, supra note 6, at 1.
113. Id. at 8.
114. Id.; see also Shabaik, supra note 1 ("[Ambassador Oren] completed his
remarks and was left with nearly 15 minutes to answer questions from the
audience. Instead of fielding questions, however, he left early to attend a Los
Angeles Lakers basketball game and to meet their star player, Kobe Bryant.").
115. Erwin Chemerinsky, Criminal Charges Against Hecklers Go Too Far,
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also suspended the Muslim Student Union (MSU), the university's
Muslim student organization, for an academic quarter and placed
the organization on two-year probation.'1 6
The Orange County District Attorney's Office did not
immediately press charges against the Irvine 11."' However, on
April 5, 2010, an anonymous source sent the District Attorney's
Office a package containing emails between various MSU
members discussing details of their planned protests of the
event."' After reading the emails, the District Attorney's Office
began to consider charging the students with conspiracy to commit
a crime, on the grounds that the students had "meticulously
planned [a] conspiracy to disturb an assembly or meeting.""9 On
February 4, 2011, almost a year after the crime occurred, the
District Attorney formally charged each of the students with two
misdemeanor counts.120 The first count accused the students of
violating section 403's provisions against willfully disturbing an
assembly; the second count accused the students of participating
in a conspiracy to disrupt a meeting.
The Irvine 11 case touched upon "competing free speech
claims, with both sides arguing they have the Constitution on
their side." 2 2 On one hand, the defense argued that the student
protest was an exercise of free speech, protected by the First
Amendment.12' The defense also questioned the constitutionality
of section 403, contending that the "current law makes lawful
protest unlawful."'2 4 On the other hand, the prosecution contended
ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.ocregister.com/opinion/
students-287394-criminal-charges.html. The specific sanctions imposed by UCI
against the students cannot be revealed due to privacy of educational records. Id.
116. Meyer, supra note 13; see also Jennifer Medina, Charges Against Muslim
Students Prompt Debate Over Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011, at A12.
117. See Medina, supra note 116.
118. See People's Opposition to Motion, supra note 6, at 9.
119. Id.
120. See Medina, supra note 116 (noting the length of time between the event
and the filing of charges); Eugene Volokh, Prosecution of Students Who Disrupted
UC Irvine Speech by Israeli Ambassador, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 9, 2011),
http://volokh.com/2011/02/09/prosecution-of-students-who-disrupted-uc-irvine-
speech-by-israeli-ambassador/.
121. Medina, supra note 116.
122. Justin Elliott, Criminalizing Campus Protest, SALON (Feb. 9, 2011),
http://www.salon.com/2011/02/09/uc irvine chargeslisrael-protest/.
123. See Nicole Santa Cruz, L.A. Now: Irvine 11 Students Appeal Conviction,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.comlanow/2011/10/irvine-11-
students-appeal-conviction-.html.
124. Id. Dan Stormer, an attorney for the defense, also noted that "[wihen we
censor free speech we are taking away one of the fundamental issues that has made
our democracy, not survive, but thrive."
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that the students violated Mr. Oren's First Amendment right to
free speech by substantially disrupting his speech. 2' The case
went to trial, and on September 23, 2011, the students were found
guilty of both counts and sentenced to community service, fines,
and probation.'26 On October 19, 2011, the defense filed notices of
appeal to contest the students' convictions.12' As of April 2012, the
case is still pending.12
C. Recent Instances of Distinguished Speakers Being
Heckled
Similar instances involving the heckling of distinguished
speakers have taken place in Orange County and even on the UCI
campus.' 2' At UCI, the College Republicans disrupted a speech by
getting on stage with premade signs, surrounding the speaker,
and taking his microphone."' In Orange Country, the former Vice
President of the United States, Dick Cheney, was also confronted
by audience members during a speaking tour for his book.'"' One
of the protestors interrupted his speech, stating that she was
making a citizen's arrest against Cheney for committing war
crimes.12' None of these incidents, however, led to a prosecution.'3
IV. The Value of Heckling
A. Heckling Advances First Amendment Values
To determine whether heckling, the form of protest conducted
by the Irvine 11, should warrant prosecution, it is helpful to
examine how heckling fits into the greater free speech frame-
work.'"' Methods of protests such as heckling can arguably further
the goals articulated in the theories underlying the First
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. Timeline of Events, STAND WITH THE ELEVEN, http://www.irvinell.com/
timeline/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
128. See id.
129. See Esposito, supra note 23; Matt Coker, [UPDATED with Ex-Veep's
"Arrest":] Dick Cheney Greeted by Protestors at Nixon Library, OC WEEKLY (Sept. 8
2011), http://blogs.ocweekly.com/navelgazing/2011/09/dick cheney-protest nixon
libr.php.
130. See Esposito, supra note 23.
131. See Coker, supra note 129.
132. Id. Cheney acknowledged the protestor's right to free speech, stating that
"[there is nothing more important than the right of people to express their
opinions. Their freedom to speak is guaranteed by the Constitution."
133. See Esposito, supra note 23; Coker, supra note 129.
134. See Aleaziz, supra note 19.
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Amendment."' First, heckling offers an important contribution to
the marketplace of ideas. As the California Supreme Court
acknowledged, expressing political dissent through heckling, "even
though rudely timed or phrased," may advance the purposes of the
First Amendment by promoting the exchange of ideas.'36 Heckling
can force a speaker to discuss and acknowledge important issues,
allowing listeners to reach "more informed and rational
decisions."' Further, heckling can equalize the disparities in
communicative power within the marketplace of ideas. "' Through
heckling, groups with less communicative power can access the
same venue and audience as groups that have greater commun-
icative power."'
Second, from a social control perspective, heckling can serve
as a means by which disaffected persons can release their
frustration and energy, thus maintaining the balance between
stability and change.'4 0  Third, heckling can further self-
governance by giving people the opportunity to participate in the
political decision-making process by expressing their opinions on
issues of public importance.14 ' For example, in today's increasingly
globalized world, foreign political and human rights issues are of
great concern domestically. Therefore, voicing political dissent
about an issue of concern both domestically and internationally-
such as human rights abuses in Palestine, as the Irvine 11 did-
may contribute to the democratic decision-making process by
exposing the audience to a different point of view.14 ' Last, by
allowing individuals to express views that impassion them, heck-
ling allows one to evolve as a person, thus advancing individual
autonomy. 4 ' Expressing political dissent through heckling can
consequently advance the values underlying freedom of speech.
Of course, if participants constantly heckle during an
assembly and speak at the same time, no one will be able to
communicate effectively and express their First Amendment
135. See Wagner, supra note 32, at 229.
136. In re Kay, 464 P.2d 142, 147 (Cal. 1970).
137. Wagner, supra note 32, at 230; see In re Kay, 464 P.2d at 147 ("The very
possibility of adverse audience reaction may aid in the correction of evils which
would otherwise escape opposition. . . . The public interest in an active and critical
audience has long been recognized.").
138. See supra note 39-40 and accompanying text.
139. See id.
140. See Wagner, supra note 32, at 230; supra notes 43-47 and accompanying
text.
141. See Wagner, supra note 32, at 230.
142. See id. at 229-30.
143. See id. at 230; supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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rights.'" Further, heckling should not be used as a means to try to
intimidate a speaker or shut down a speaker. In instances where
the interruption is short, the audience is able to hear the speaker,
and the speaker is able to finish the speech, heckling will not
substantially disrupt the primary speaker's ability to speak or the
audience's ability to listen.'4 5 "The heckler will be allowed to
express his or her position, the primary speaker will then be able
to continue with his or her message, and the audience will be able
to hear all viewpoints."1 6  Thus, allowing rude and untimely
outbursts from the audience can enhance the rights of all in a
public assembly."
B. The Importance of Heckling to Minority Groups
Heckling holds special significance in the public assembly
setting as a form of protest for groups with less communicative
power. Public assembly is of "special and crucial significance for
radical, unpopular or underprivileged individuals and groups." 8
This is because:
[Plublic assemblies possess important advantages for effective
expression that do not inhere in other forms of communication.
They permit face-to-face contact between the speaker and his
audience, thereby increasing the flexibility of the interchange
and enhancing the power of the communication. For the
participants they evoke feelings of solidarity and mutual
support. For the audience they evidence the intensity and
dedication with which the views expressed are held.
Public assembly serves as an unmatched platform, particularly for
minority groups because they lack equal access to the "mass media
of communication.""' Therefore, public assembly gives minority
groups access to a wider audience that may not otherwise have an
opportunity to hear the groups' point of view.'' Countering or
responding to a speaker through heckling serves as a powerful
means of communication. It allows the audience to hear an
opposing viewpoint immediately after a remark is made and
144. See Wagner, supra note 32, at 235.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. In re Kay, 464 P.2d 142, 147 (Cal. 1970) (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 397
U.S. 64, 73 (1964)).
148. Kevin Francis O'Neill & Raymond Vasvari, Counter-Demonstration as
Protected Speech: Finding the Right to Confrontation in Existing First Amendment
Law, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 77, 121 (1995).
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experience the passion with which those views are held. Further,
"It]he reporting of [the minority groups'] activities in the mass
media, despite the unfavorable slant which may be given," can
enlarge the particular audience that will hear their views.152
For some minority groups, such as the Irvine 11, heckling as
a form of protest also holds symbolic value. The Irvine 11 saw
themselves as giving a "voice to the voiceless" Palestinians who
were murdered during the Gaza massacre.1 5 3 Critics of the method
of protest used by the Irvine 11 argue that students have ample
opportunity to voice their dissent by asking constructive questions
during the "question and answer" session of a university lecture.14
However, the Irvine 11 contend that they wanted to "make a
poignant statement" by challenging the established framework of
the "question and answer" session."' One of the Irvine 11 students
elaborated on this point:
An effective protest must voice its opposition in a manner that
challenges the policies Oren represents and the framework
through which those policies are propagated. Protesters who
threw tea into the Boston Harbor, who sat-in at segregated
lunch counters, who marched against South African apartheid,
and who are now Drotestine for their basic human rights
across the Arab world all understood this crucial distinction.'56
Hence, through heckling, the Irvine 11 saw themselves as not only
challenging the status quo and raising awareness on Palestinian
issues in the United States, but also as speaking on behalf of
Palestinians who were massacred as a result of Israel's siege in
Gaza."' Accordingly, for the Irvine 11, another form of protest
such as picketing outside of the auditorium or holding up signs did
not hold the same significance or power as heckling.5"' Heckling
served as a powerful means of protest for the students because "a
remark made immediately following a speaker's statement has
much more force than that same remark made out of context."59
Heckling allowed the students to challenge the powerful position
152. Id.
153. Nora Barrows-Friedman, The Irvine 11: Giving Voice to the Voiceless, AL-
JAZEERA (Sept. 26 2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/09/2011
926103946574233.html. One of the Irvine 11 described what inspired him to
protest: "I intend to ... give a voice to the voiceless, including [those of] my cousins
who died during the Gaza massacre. And the 1,400 other civilians who lost their
lives during that massacre as well." Id.
154. See Shabaik, supra note 1.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Barrows-Friedman, supra note 153.




of the speaker and the policies that the speaker represented by
having a face-to-face, direct, and immediate impact upon the
speaker and the audience. Considering the potential value that
heckling has within the greater free speech framework, and the
significance it has for groups that lack communicative power, the
criminalization of heckling seems inherently unfair and contrary
to the values of the First Amendment.
V. Prosecuting the Irvine 11: The Selective Enforcement of
Section 403
A. Stereotypes and Biases Influenced the Irvine 11
Prosecution
Prosecutors are no less biased than the average American;
presumably, prosecutors are just as prone to harboring biases
against certain groups as the general population.' Prejudice and
bias against Muslims are prevalent within the United States, and
in some instances it is even state sanctioned.'"' In fact, our "public
discourse has deteriorated to the point" where members of the
general public, including politicians and other reputable figures,
can speak derogatorily about Muslims "with complete impunity."16 '
Many Americans admit to holding prejudice against Muslims and
generally have an unfavorable opinion of Muslims.' 3 According to
social cognition theory, these biases against Muslims can influence
the decision-making process and perception of those who hold
them, both consciously and subconsciously.'" Because
prosecutors, like the general public, sometimes hold biases against
Muslims, social cognition theory supports the idea that these
biases may influence prosecutors' decision-making, both
consciously and subconsciously.
Sometimes, bias and prejudice against minorities influence
prosecutorial decision-making. Of course, in some cases involving
the prosecution of minorities, prosecutors may be blamed for
having discriminatory intent when they in fact do not. In the
Irvine 11 prosecution, the facts suggest that the prosecution may
have been influenced by bias and prejudice against Muslims. The
Irvine 11 prosecution highlights how prosecutorial discretion can
160. See Greene, supra note 66, at 780.
161. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text for a discussion on
Islamophobia in the United States.
162. CAIR ISLAMOPHOBIA REPORT, supra note 76, at 24.
163. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
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lead to the unequal treatment for similarly situated defendants.
For instance, prominent speakers, including former Vice President
Dick Cheney, have been heckled in Orange County.1 65 The College
Republicans at UCI have severely disrupted an event, to the point
of shutting it down, on the UCI Campus.'66 Yet none of these
groups or individuals have faced criminal prosecution for similar,
or arguably more offensive, disruptions.1 67 The nonprosecutions of
these cases-which both involved heckling during a public
assembly-lend credence to the assertion that prosecuting willful
disturbance of an assembly is not the norm in Orange County;
rather, it is the exception.'" Further, concerns about prejudice
against Muslims influencing the prosecution are bolstered because
the Orange County District Attorney's Office referred to the Irvine
11 case as the "UCI Muslim Case" in internal office emails.16 9
Additionally, some have noted that the Orange County District
Attorney may have pursued charges against the Irvine 11 as a
political tool to "pander . . . to the right-wing conservative com-
munity in Orange Country because he is up for reelection this
year.""7 e Although factors such as race, religion, and politics
should not be taken into account when a prosecutor makes his or
her decision to charge a defendant, such biases, when they are
taken into account, can lead to unfair treatment and discrim-
inatory enforcement of crimes.1 7 1 Therefore, to guard against
abuse of discretion, prosecutors must take affirmative steps to
make sure that biases and prejudices do not influence their
decision-making process.172
B. Irvine 11: An Example of the Potential for
Discriminatory Enforcement of Speech Crimes
Statutes that prosecute types of speech are prone to
discriminatory enforcement.1 7 ' The Irvine 11 students were
charged under section 403 for a willful disturbance of assembly.174
This statute is different from a breach of the peace statute because
instead of penalizing the speaker, it penalizes an audience
165. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
166. See Esposito, supra note 23.
167. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
168. See Esposito, supra note 23.
169. Contra People's Opposition to Motion, supra note 6, at 19.
170. Barrett, supra note 10.
171. See Greene, supra note 66, at 756-57.
172. See infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
174. Medina, supra note 116.
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member.'"' However, like breach of peace statutes, willful
disturbance statutes are also prone to discriminatory enforcement.
The Irvine 11 case highlights the inherent flaw in willful
disturbance of assembly statutes. Even though section 403 is
content-neutral,16 it can still be discriminatorily enforced by
prosecutors when they take legal action against individuals based
on the content of their speech. Speakers have been heckled in
public assemblies in Orange County, yet individuals who heckle
are usually not charged and prosecuted for a misdemeanor
crime. Only those audience members that disturb an assembly
by making controversial remarks may end up being penalized
under the statute. This is precisely what happened in the Irvine
11 case; the students made politically controversial and conten-
tious remarks against the Israeli Ambassador, a high profile
diplomat, during his discussion of a controversial topic-the
Israel-Palestine conflict."' The views that the Irvine 11 espoused
were so objectionable to some that an anonymous source delivered
a detailed packet of information to the various stakeholders who
could potentially investigate the incident, in order to prompt legal
action and punishment against the Irvine 11. '9 Those who sought
to prosecute the Irvine 11 succeeded because the anonymous
packet eventually spurred the Orange County District Attorney's
decision to press charges.'o The Irvine 11 prosecution exposes an
inherent flaw in willful disturbance of assembly statutes: even
though law enforcement officials are prohibited from penalizing
individuals based on the content of their speech, they can use
willful disturbance of assembly statutes to charge people based on
content.5 '
175. See supra notes 84-92 (discussing breach of the peace statutes).
176. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 403 (West 1999).
177. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 11-12. At UCI, Ambassador Michael Oren was speaking
about Israel's invasion in Gaza in 2008, known as "Operation Cast Lead," during
which he served as spokesman for the Israeli government. See Esposito, supra note
23 ("[Ambassador Oren] did not just speak about history, culture or economics, but
a very contentious political conflict and set of issues that has taken the lives and
shattered the families of Israelis and Palestinians and in which each side has
accused the other of engaging in illegitimate forms of violence and terror.").
179. See People's Opposition to Motion, supra note 6, Ex. 1. The packet was sent
to members of Congress, the District Attorney's Office, and various UCI officials,
among others. Id.
180. See id. at 9.
181. See Kagan, supra note 86, at 462.
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C. A Decision to Prosecute the Irvine 11: A Matter
of Bad Policy
The decision to prosecute the Irvine 11 was bad policy
because it will alienate minority groups, chill free speech and
student activism on college campuses, and undermine the
university ethos. Muslim students at UCI had previously been
alienated by law enforcement officials because of prior Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) presence involving surveillance of
the Muslim community on campus and in the greater Orange
County area.1' The prosecution of the Irvine 11, given its selective
nature, will further alienate Muslim students who already feel
targeted by law enforcement because of their religious affiliation.1 3
In the aftermath of the prosecution, students at UCI have
expressed fear of involvement with MSU out of "fear of
repercussions."" An MSU student leader at UCI commented on
the effect of the Irvine 11 prosecution on the MSU: "People are
afraid to be seen as with [MSU], . . . it's like [law enforcement]
went after them, how do we know they aren't going to come after
us next?"""
The prosecution of the Irvine 11 will also chill speech and
curb student activism on college campuses across the nation. '6
Public universities "value and foster" free speech on campus"' and
traditionally have been a place for students to "exercise their own
right to protest nonviolently, as well as to participate actively in
our democracy by questioning authority and institutions." 8  The
182. See Ron Campbell, FBI Says It Wasn't Investigating UCI, OC REG. (May 21,
2007), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/campus-131610-agent-fbi.html (describing
an incident where an FBI agent followed an MSU student on the UCI campus);
Cindy Carcamo & Sonya Smith, Muslims Leery of FBI Activity: Assurances that the
Community Isn't Under Watch Meet with Skepticism, OC REG. (June 17, 2006),
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/community-43648-fbi-muslim.html (describing
incidents of FBI surveillance in Orange County).
183. See, e.g., Carcamo & Smith, supra note 182 (noting that a Muslim student
at UCI believes that "the fact that she's Muslim is the reason she's been singled out
for searches at airports and been scrutinized by police at anti-war
demonstrations.").
184. See Medina, supra note 116.
185. Id.
186. See Tim Fucci, Students Sit-In and Speak Out Over Irvine 11 Guilty Verdict,
UC SANTA BARBARA: THE BOTTOM LINE (Oct. 18, 2011), http://thebottomline.as.
ucsb.edu/2011/10/students-sit-in-and-speak-out-over-uc-irvine-11-guilty-verdict
(noting that a professor is concerned about the "potential silence effect" of the
Irvine 11 prosecution).
187. Id.
188. Catharine Debelle, The UC Irvine 11: District Attorney Attacks Free Speech




Irvine 11 prosecution, however, sends the opposite message to
students: if you participate in nonviolent political protest, you
may face harsh penalties, including criminalization or even
prosecution.
Finally, the prosecution of the Irvine 11 is bad policy because
it undermines the university ethos, which not only encourages
students to challenge ideas and assemble around issues that
impassion them, but also aims to expose students to diverse view-
points.'"' A fundamental aspect of college education is the ability
to engage in critical discourse and evaluation of ideas, which can
only be done if students are given the opportunity to freely
communicate and exchange ideas.'90 Even outside the classroom,
students are encouraged to continue the discourse and evaluation
by putting their "ideas into action" through student organi-
zations.19 ' However, criminalizing students for voicing political
dissent through a nonviolent political process, as the Irvine 11 did,
undermines the university ethos. In an environment where such
assembly is encouraged, it is almost "unreasonable" not "to expect
students . . . to become involved and act on issues of concern from
global politics and the economy to human rights and ecology." 192
Tolerance of others, including respect for different political
beliefs, is another fundamental aspect of the discourse in college
communities.' Students should not use speech as a form of
promoting intolerance, nor should students use speech as a tool to
silence a speaker with whom they do not agree. However,
students should not be prosecuted when they assemble to air their
grievances regarding human rights abuses abroad and express
political dissent in a peaceful way. Freedom of speech, therefore,
deserves more protection in the university setting because it is a
vital aspect of a well-rounded university education. Any policy
that criminalizes speech should be weighed against the impor-
tance of freedom of speech in the university environment.
attorney-attacks-free-speech-rights-of-students-nationwide/.
189. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
190. See Anderson, supra note 46, at 177-78.
191. See Esposito, supra note 23.
192. Id.
193. Freedom of Expression: Rights with Responsibilities, UCI POLICE
DEPARTMENT, http://www.police.uci.edu/safety/publications/speech.pdf (last visited
Mar. 16, 2012) (listing "Principles of Community" as: "Tolerance, civility and
mutual respect for diversity of background, gender, ethnicity, race, and religion is a
crucial [sic] within our campus community as is tolerance[,] civility and mutual
respect for diversity of political beliefs, sexual orientation, and physical abilities").
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VI. The Prosecution of the Irvine 11: Solutions to Curb a
Bad Policy
The prosecution of the Irvine 11 and the controversy
surrounding the incident present a problem that is twofold. First,
abuse of prosecutorial discretion must be prevented so that section
403 cannot be selectively enforced. Second, universities must take
steps to promote dialogue and discourse among students on
campus in an effort to ensure that students do not resort to
heckling to air their grievances.
A. Preventing the Abuse of Prosecutorial Discretion
The most effective way to prevent the selective enforcement
of section 403 is for the California Legislature to repeal the law.
However, prosecutors can also take steps to ensure that bias and
prejudice do not influence their decisions. For example, prose-
cutors can initiate dialogue with minority communities, such as
Muslims, who feel targeted and threatened by law enforcement.
This small action would provide them with an opportunity to gain
a different perspective and make them aware of any conscious and
unconscious biases that they may possess.
1. Heckling Legislation
Section 403 is problematic because it criminalizes heckling.
A law that criminalizes speech such as heckling is ripe for
discriminatory enforcement and has little benefit.' Heckling as a
form of speech can also serve to further the values of the First
Amendment and effectively enhance the rights of all: the heckler,
the primary speaker, and the audience.' 5 Further, heckling can
function as an important form of protest for minority groups who
may not otherwise have the opportunity to have their voices
heard.'" As demonstrated by the Irvine 11 case, the risks of
criminalizing heckling greatly outweigh the benefits. Heckling a
speaker may be rude, but rude conduct alone should not warrant
criminalization. 9 7
194. See supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 148-59 and accompanying text.
197. In re Kay, 464 P.2d 142, 147 (Cal. 1970).
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2. Dialogue Between Prosecutors and Minority
Communities
Given that bias and prejudice may have played a role in the
Irvine 11 prosecution, in the future prosecutors should initiate and
maintain dialogue with minority communities in order to enhance
their awareness of-and help eliminate-bias and prejudice in
their decisions. Dialogue with communities, particularly those
like Muslims, who feel especially targeted by law enforcement, 98
can expose prosecutors to outside community perspectives on
prosecutorial decisions."' Further, such interaction can help
balance the "prosecutors' biased majoritarian perspective with
outsider community perspectives." 200  Hopefully, dialogue with
minority communities will educate prosecutors about bias and
prejudice in their own actions, and will enable prosecutors to
institute reforms.2 0 1
Some prosecutorial offices already have programs to initiate
dialogue with the Muslim community. The United States
Attorney's Office in Washington, D.C. has a Muslim Outreach
Initiative that fosters dialogue between Muslim and Sikh
communities and the United States Attorney's Office.202 Part of
the initiative includes programs giving members of the Muslim
community the opportunity to speak with prosecutors about their
issues with law enforcement, including their feelings of victim-
ization by the police.2" The Muslim Outreach Initiative is a step
in the right direction for prosecutors' offices; other prosecutors'
offices, especially state prosecutors, should adopt similar
programs. Similar initiatives will expose prosecutors to outside
perspectives on how their charging decisions are viewed by
Muslims and how they affect communities both negatively and
positivity. Further, outreach initiatives can serve as a platform to
educate prosecutors on their conscious and unconscious biases by
providing them with an alternate perspective on their decisions,
198. It is important for prosecutors to build dialogue with all minority
communities that are affected by law enforcement. However, for the purposes of
this Article, this section will focus specifically on Muslims, the population involved
in the Irvine 11 case.
199. See Greene, supra note 66, at 739.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 799.
202. See Community Prosecution: Community Outreach Programs, U.S. ArIT'Y'S
OFF. D.C., http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/programs/cp/cp-outreach-programs.html
(last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
203. See id.
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which can serve to counteract their dominant and powerful
204
voices.
B. Promoting Discourse and Dialogue Within the
University
The Irvine 11 prosecution also presents complex challenges
for universities, and the reasons why students choose to resort to
heckling to have their voices heard. The criticism of the
marketplace of ideas may offer one explanation as to why. Critics
of the marketplace of ideas contend that the marketplace reflects
disparities in communicative power, where mainstream ideas or
those with power to control the marketplace to the disadvantage of
nonmainstream views."' If certain students do not have equal
access to the marketplace on campus, the option of engaging in
civil discourse may not be available to them.206 Even before the
protest, Muslims students at UCI felt that their voices were
marginalized within the greater discourse on campus.207 Without
the option to engage in civil discourse, some students may resort to
other methods, such as heckling, to communicate their views, as
was witnessed in the Irvine 11 case.20s
Universities can play an important role in removing
disparities in communicative power and ensuring that all students
have equal access to discourse on campus. After the Irvine 11
protest, instead of fostering dialogue between groups on campus,
UCI suspended the MSU for a quarter and placed the organization
on probation for two years.2 " The suspension and probation
further alienated the organization on campus because new
members were afraid to join the organization due to its tarnished
reputation.21 0 Instead of penalizing students for protesting in such
204. See Greene, supra note 66, at 795.
205. See BUNKER, supra note 42, at 8; supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
206. Beena Ahmad, Universities Struggles to Respond to Student Outrage, BLOG
NAT'L COALITION AGAINST CENSORSHIP (Feb. 23, 2010), http://ncacblog.wordpress
.com/2010/02/23/universities-struggle-to-respond-to-student-outrage/.
207. See Medina, supra note 116 ("Muslim students say that they have faced
stricter scrutiny from the administration than other student groups"); Ahmad,
supra note 206 (noting that Muslims groups had complained that the university
had rejected their requests to have speakers come discuss the Palestine issue, and
that "tensions had been building among the university's Muslim students from the
constant threat of FBI surveillance they face in Orange County and their campus
community").
208. See Ahmad, supra note 206 ("[Clivil discourse may not be available to
students who feel pushed to the margins of their academic community.").
209. See Meyer, supra note 13.
210. See Medina, supra note 116.
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a harsh manner, universities should use protests to create a
learning opportunity for students, implement programs that foster
dialogue among groups to resolve conflict, and help students
understand both sides of an issue.21
The Difficult Dialogues National Resource Center, which
provides faculty and staff with the tools to promote dialogue on
contentious issues, has recently initiated a program at UCI.212 The
project seeks to build on attempts to protect academic freedom,
and will use "techniques drawn from peace-building and respect
initiatives already under way to foster productive dialogue on
campus."2" The project includes developing new courses, including
one on issues surrounding the Israel-Palestine conflict; seminars,
which equip faculty members with the tools to facilitate dialogue
amongst students on sensitive issues; and lectures and public
events that focus on conflict, peace-building, and "successful
collaborations that have grown out of situations once dominated by
conflict."214 Universities should use the tools provided by programs
such as Difficult Dialogues to promote and foster civil dialogue
between student groups, as well as to give students a platform to
discuss their viewpoints on issues that impassion them. However,
universities must ensure that minority groups, and the views that
they espouse, are equally represented in these educational
programs. In order to have meaningful dialogue, disparities in
communicative power need to be removed and groups that are
marginalized by the campus community need to be given the
platform to speak.
Conclusion
Muslim students in the United States are increasingly
subject to surveillance by law enforcement on account of their
religion."' The Irvine 11 case highlights how Muslim students can
also be subject to selective prosecution. The legal system must
guard against abuse in the form of selective prosecution so that
groups do not face discriminatory and unequal treatment due to
211. About, DIFFICULT DIALOGUES: NAT'L RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.
difficultdialogues.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
212. Difficult Dialogues: Project/ University of California, Irvine: Overview,
NAT'L RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.difficultdialogues.org/projects/university
of california irvine/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Associated Press, NYPD Monitored Muslim Students All over the
Northeast, USA TODAY (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.usatoday.comnews/nation/
story/2012-02-18/NYPD-Intelligence/53143776/1.
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characteristics such as religion. A prosecution policy that
criminalizes students for expressing political dissent is extremely
alarming because it will have the effect of alienating minority
students, chilling speech, and creating tension on campus, a place
where freedom of speech is of the utmost importance. Universities
must also take steps to ensure that Muslim students are not
alienated on campus. When students engage in nonviolent
protest, instead of penalizing them, universities should create an
opportunity for dialogue on campus. The prosecution of the Irvine
11 is bad precedent and should not be followed by prosecutors in
other jurisdictions.

